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AMICUS BRIEFS:
SOUNDING OFF ON REFORMING
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
Joy Lynn Bala*
Inequitable conduct, which has been characterized as an “absolute
plague” and an “atomic bomb,” allows an accused infringer to assert
an affirmative defense against a patentee for violating the duty of
candor and good faith in acquiring a patent. The consequences of this
“atomic bomb” extend well beyond the litigation context and
significantly impact the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
patent agents, and patent attorneys. Such consequences include
exorbitant litigation costs, overdisclosure to the PTO and thus
decreased efficiency by PTO examiners, disciplinary action and
potential disbarment of patent agents and attorneys, and even
decreased innovation. The Federal Circuit’s recent en banc, 6–1–4
decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. attempted to
reshape the doctrine. However, the decision also highlighted the court’s
varying viewpoints, and the optimistic majority may not have cured the
doctrine’s problems. Courts are responsive to the differing roles of
patents in the myriad industries that patent law affects, and courts often
turn to amicus briefs, which provide an important source of information
regarding the role of patents within varying innovation contexts.
Amicus briefs thus constitute key sources of empirical data that can be
used in studying the patent system. As a result, these briefs can be
particularly influential. Therefore, this Note’s analysis of the thirty-four
amicus briefs in Therasense sheds light on the various commercial and
societal concerns of patent law and, most importantly, on the impact
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that inequitable conduct has on these myriad interests. This Note
discusses data that were gathered from the briefs and that center on the
three doctrinal components of inequitable conduct: materiality, intent,
and the balancing step. Furthermore, this Note proposes a solution that
focuses on the three prongs in light of the different arguments that the
amici proposed: (1) courts should adopt Rule 1.56 as the materiality
standard, which the Federal Circuit can further clarify by establishing
factors for lower courts to consider in evaluating this prong; (2) courts
should require a specific intent to deceive to satisfy the intent prong;
and (3) courts should eliminate a sliding scale approach to the
balancing step and maintain the harsh penalty of unenforceability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In patent law, commentators have extensively criticized and
characterized inequitable conduct as an “absolute plague”1 and an
“atomic bomb.”2 The doctrine of inequitable conduct allows an
accused infringer to assert an affirmative defense against a patentee
for violating the duty of candor and good faith during the patentee’s
acquisition of the patent. The consequences of this “atomic bomb”
extend well beyond the litigation context and significantly impact the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), patent agents, and patent
attorneys. Such consequences include exorbitant litigation costs,
disciplinary actions against and potential disbarment of patent agents
and attorneys, and even decreased innovation; moreover, the doctrine
incentivizes patent applicants to overdisclose information to the
PTO, thereby decreasing the efficiency of PTO examiners.3 Scholars
and practitioners have extensively discussed these problems and have
called for reform.4
In Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,5 the Federal
Circuit granted a request for an en banc hearing regarding inequitable
conduct,6 signaling the court’s recognition of the need to resolve
issues surrounding the doctrine. Although the court appears to have
1. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
2. Randall R. Rader, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit: Foreword: Always at the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 AM.
U. L. REV. 777, 782 (2010).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See, e.g., David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 946 (2010);
Benjamin Brown, Comment, Inequitable Conduct: A Standard in Motion, 19 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 593, 593–94 (2009).
5. 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curium), opinion reinstated in part, 649 F.3d 1276
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
6. Id. Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. (“Abbott”), the successor to Therasense, Inc. and a
subsidiary of Abbott Laboratories, brought a patent infringement suit against defendants Becton,
Dickinson and Co., its supplier Nova Biomedical Corp., and Bayer HealthCare LLC, for Abbott’s
U.S. Patent No. 5,820, 551 (the “’551 patent”). Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593
F.3d 1289, 1293 (Fed. Cir.), vacated, 374 F. App’x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (per curium), opinion
reinstated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The defendants then asserted that their
products did not infringe Abbott’s patents and that the patents were invalid. Id. Subsequently, the
District Court held the ’551 patent unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Id. On appeal, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding. Id. at 1311. However, the majority and
dissent viewed materiality and intent differently. Id. at 1312 (Linn, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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reshaped the doctrine,7 its 6–1–4 decision also shows how the
Federal Circuit features many varying viewpoints. Moreover, some
scholars have already suggested that the optimistic majority may not
have fashioned a test to cure all of the doctrine’s problems.8 Thus,
the story surrounding inequitable conduct may not be over.9
Prior to the en banc hearing, the Federal Circuit not only asked
the parties to file briefs addressing the current standards of the
doctrine but also called for amici to voice their concerns on the
matter.10 More than thirty amicus briefs, each articulating its own
viewpoint on inequitable conduct, were filed.
Amici importantly represent patentees, the “fourth pillar” of the
patent system.11 The courts are responsive to the differing roles of
patents in the myriad industries affected by patent law,12 and the
courts often turn to amicus briefs, which provide an important source
of information regarding the role of patents within varying
innovation contexts.13 The Federal Circuit has stated that the number
and diversity of the briefs “reflect the complexity of these
[commercial and societal] concerns,” which lies “not in the fate of
these litigants and these long-expired patents” but “in the way this
judge made law affects technologic innovation and competition.”14
Furthermore, amicus briefs can influence the courts—including the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court—and appear to be more cost7. See infra Part II.C.
8. Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickinson: A First
Impression, (Aug. 5, 2011) (unpublished essay), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859764.
9. In July 2011, the PTO proposed “to revise the materiality standard for the duty to
disclose information to the [PTO] in patent applications and reexamination proceedings set forth
in §§ 1.56(b) and 1.555(b) in light of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Therasense.” Revision of
the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose Information in Patent
Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43631, 43632 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be codified as amended at
37 C.F.R. pt. 1). The PTO even sought comments concerning the proposed rule change. Id.
10. Therasense, 374 F. App’x at 35. For a discussion of the en banc holding, see infra
Part II.
11. The three other pillars are represented by Congress, the courts, and the PTO. Colleen V.
Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System 5
(Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 10–05, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1608111&rec=1&srcabs=1656568.
12. Id. at 6 (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)).
13. Id. at 3.
14. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
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effective than lobbying Congress is; thus, because of their
effectiveness, the briefs are an attractive means for commentators to
voice concerns.15 Because of these advantages, amicus interest is at
an all-time high.16
Amicus briefs constitute a key source of empirical data for
studying the patent system.17 For example, Colleen V. Chien found
that patentees and their lawyers, “creators” of the patents, composed
75 percent of briefs that were filed in the Supreme Court and Federal
Circuit from 1989 to 2009.18 The remaining 25 percent were filed by
public interest advocates and “consumers” of patented goods, such as
citizen groups, governments, and academics.19 Moreover, Chien
determined that the Supreme Court ruled in alliance with the position
that the United States advocated in every instance but one.20
According to Chien’s findings, amicus briefs that the United States
and PTO filed predicted the prevailing party in 90 percent of
Supreme Court cases and in 80 percent of Federal Circuit cases.21
Additionally, Chien found that a company’s business model can
predict the position that it would take in any amicus brief.22 For
example, patent holding companies and universities—which often
have limited exposure as patent defendants yet often have significant
opportunities as patent licensors or plaintiffs—heavily favor strong
patent rights for the patentee, while public companies often oppose
the patentee.23
Analysis of the thirty-four briefs that were filed in Therasense
can shed light on the various commercial and societal concerns of
patent law and, most importantly, on the impact of inequitable
conduct on these myriad interests. Moreover, because amicus briefs
significantly influence the Federal Circuit, these briefs can also
provide insight into how inequitable conduct should be changed.

15. Chien, supra note 11, at 6.
16. For example, more than sixty-five non-party amicus briefs were filed in the recent
Supreme Court case Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 5–6.
18. Id. at 13, 15–16.
19. Id. at 16–17.
20. Id. at 31.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 34.
23. Id. at 25.
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Part II.A discusses the historical development of inequitable conduct,
and Part II.B presents the numerous drawbacks of the doctrine that
caught the attention of an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit.
Part II.C discusses the recent en banc Therasense decision and
suggests that the test may not be a cure-all for the doctrine. Part III
briefly describes the design and methodology that this Note employs
in analyzing these amicus briefs, including an explanation of why
this Note’s study is important. Part IV presents a summary and
analysis of data that are gathered from the briefs; it focuses
particularly on the doctrinal components of materiality, intent, and
the balancing step. Part IV also includes a comparison to Chien’s
findings in an attempt to highlight any revelations that are unique to
inequitable conduct. Part V proposes a solution that differs slightly
from that in the recent Therasense decision and that focuses on the
three main prongs of inequitable conduct in light of the different
arguments that the amici proposed: (1) the maintenance of specific
intent to deceive as the standard for intent; (2) the elimination of
sliding scale formulations of the balancing step, and the maintenance
of the harsh penalty of unenforceability; and (3) the use of 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.56 (“Rule 1.56”) as the standard for materiality with delineated
factors for courts to use in determining if information is material.
II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT:
PRE- AND
POST-THERASENSE
A. Historical Development
Inequitable conduct is a judicially created doctrine that
originated from a trilogy of Supreme Court cases.24 In each of these
cases, the entire patent acquisition and enforcement process had been
tainted with egregious fraud, perjury, and extortion; without such
fraudulent conduct, the patent right would not have been
enforceable.25 The only remaining question for the Supreme Court
was how the fraudulent conduct should affect the patentee’s case.26
24. Rader, supra note 2, at 779–80; see Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint.
Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238
(1944), overruled on other grounds by Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 429 U.S. 17 (1976);
Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
25. Rader, supra note 2, at 779, 781.
26. Id. at 779–80.
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The trilogy culminated in Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v.
Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,27 where the Supreme Court
fashioned an inequitable conduct defense from the equitable doctrine
of unclean hands.28 Although the Supreme Court did not articulate a
specific test or provide detailed guidance on inequitable conduct, the
doctrine developed over the next few decades with influences from
the courts and the PTO.29
An alleged patent infringer may assert inequitable conduct as an
affirmative defense to patent infringement when an applicant violates
the duty of candor and good faith.30 As the doctrine stood prior to the
en banc holding in Therasense, inequitable conduct was composed of
(1) materiality; (2) intent; and (3) an equitable balancing step.31 A
finding of inequitable conduct rendered the entire patent
unenforceable and could even have adversely affected other related
patents.32 Because of its harsh penalties, inequitable conduct satisfied
two important goals: (1) enforcing the “duty of good faith and fair
dealing that binds patent applicants in dealing with the public”; and
(2) protecting the “social utility of the patent system, i.e., it attempts
to diminish the probability that unscrupulous individuals wrongfully
obtain undeserved rents.”33
Materiality, the first element, focused on whether affirmative
misrepresentations or omissions of information were material;34 this
element also still applies post-Therasense. During the ex parte

27. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
28. Id. at 815–16, 819–20.
29. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 597. In fact, the PTO created Rule 1.56 in response to
the Precision Court’s decision; Rule 1.56 was subsequently amended over the following decades,
and it reached its present form in 1992. Id. at 597, 600. For a discussion of Rule 1.56, see infra
notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Kevin Mack, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve Patent Quality:
Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 147–48 (2006) (citing DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.03[6][b][ii] (2004)).
31. See, e.g., Lee Petherbridge et al., The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 6), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1686102.
32. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(“When a court has finally determined that inequitable conduct occurred in relation to one or
more claims during prosecution of the patent application, the entire patent is unenforceable.”); see
also Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding several
patents unenforceable after determining that inequitable conduct occurred).
33. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 3 n.2.
34. See Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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process of obtaining a patent, patent applicants had to abide by
Rule 1.56 while they dealt with the PTO,35 as they still must do
today. The rule imposes a “duty of candor and good faith” on “[e]ach
individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application.”36 This includes a “duty to disclose to the Office all
information known to that individual to be material to patentability”
that extends to all pending claims.37 According to subsection (b) of
Rule 1.56:
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not
cumulative to information already of record or being made
of record in the application, and (1) It establishes, by itself
or in combination with other information, a prima facie case
of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It refutes or is
inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i)
Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the
Office or (ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.38
The rule additionally states that a prima facie case of
unpatentability is established “when the information compels a
conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance of
evidence.”39 Thus, the PTO explicitly defined a materiality standard
and the appropriate level of disclosure necessary for a patentee to
satisfy the PTO’s regulations. Although several standards existed for
finding information as material,40 courts typically used the
“reasonable examiner” test, which evaluates if a reasonable examiner
would have considered the information “important in deciding
whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.”41

35. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2010); Petherbridge, supra note 31, at 4.
36. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a).
37. Id.
38. Id. § 1.56(b).
39. Id.
40. Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315–16 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he objective ‘but for’ standard, where the misrepresentation was so material that the patent
should not have issued; the subjective ‘but for’ test, where the misrepresentation actually caused
the examiner to approve the patent application when he would not otherwise have done so; the
‘but it may have’ standard, where the misrepresentation may have influenced the patent examiner
in the course of prosecution. . . . [; and Rule 1.56,] yet a fourth ‘official standard.’” (citations
omitted)).
41. Id. at 1315 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.56).
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The second element of inequitable conduct required the court to
determine whether the patent applicant intended to deceive or
mislead the PTO;42 this prong remains a key component of the
doctrine today. Intent to deceive did not need to be proven by direct
evidence, but could have been inferred from the surrounding
circumstances of the applicant’s alleged conduct.43 Prior to
Therasense, the only clear doctrinal constraint on intent to deceive
was that it had to be greater than gross negligence.44
Both materiality and intent had to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.45 Once threshold levels of both elements were
satisfied, courts balanced all of the evidence to determine whether
the applicant behaved inequitably, and courts ultimately concluded
whether the conduct was sufficiently culpable to warrant a finding of
unenforceability.46 During the balancing step, some courts considered
a “sliding scale,” where a higher level of materiality allowed a court
to accept a lower level of intent as sufficient for a finding of
inequitable conduct.47
Because materiality and intent to deceive were conclusions of
ultimate fact based on broad factual inquiries, these elements were
only “reviewed for clear error or substantial evidence” on appeal.48
Moreover, appellate courts reviewed the balancing step by applying
an abuse of discretion standard, an even more deferential form of
review.49 Thus, alleged infringers who were victorious at the trial
level in demonstrating a patentee’s inequitable conduct secured
judgments that received some insulation from appellate courts due to
the deferential standard of review.50

42. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
43. Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGaw, Inc., 149 F.3d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
44. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 6.
45. E.g., Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1313.
46. Id.
47. E.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Questions of
‘materiality’ and ‘culpability’ are often interrelated and intertwined, so that a lesser showing of
the materiality of withheld information may suffice when an intentional scheme to defraud is
established, whereas a greater showing of the materiality of withheld information would
necessarily create an inference that its nondisclosure was ‘wrongful.’”).
48. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 7 (citations omitted).
49. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693–94 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
50. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 7.
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B. Inequitable Conduct’s
Shortcomings
Although the three elements of inequitable conduct were well
known, the test remained vague, causing some scholars to complain
of pervasive confusion and varying applications by the courts. The
unclear standards and harsh punishment associated with the doctrine
yielded several drastic consequences, impacting the patentees and
their industries, the court system, the PTO, and patent agents and
attorneys.
A scholar even described the remedy for inequitable conduct as
“death-penalty-like.”51 Denial of patent protection for the entire
length of the patent term could result from a patent applicant’s
failure to disclose information to the PTO without regard to any
inherent traits of the patented invention itself. Thus, a finding of
inequitable conduct rendered the entire patent unenforceable and
prevented the patentee from asserting the patent’s claims against
other infringers.52 This harsh penalty could even extend to related
patents, rendering those unenforceable as well.53 Furthermore, a
finding of inequitable conduct may make a case “exceptional” and
thus entitle the accused infringer to attorney fees, which can easily
reach into the seven-figure range.54 The patentee may even be
exposed to antitrust liability.55
Inequitable conduct has been viewed as a “plague” on the court
system.56 Because of the vagueness of the doctrine and the complete
unenforceability of the patent upon a finding of inequitable conduct,
the defense has become too attractive an advantage for an accused
patent infringer to ignore.57 Consequently, the accused infringers are
incentivized to assert the defense whenever possible, including
asserting the defense to infringement claims relating to patents that
the defendants have not even been accused of infringing; moreover,
51. Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 725 (2009).
52. Id. at 764.
53. See Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(holding several patents unenforceable after finding inequitable conduct).
54. Cotropia, supra note 51, at 764 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006)).
55. Id.
56. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
57. E.g., Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1346 (2009).
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accused infringers take advantage of the vague standards of the
doctrine by strategically choosing particular articulations of the test
that are most favorable to their cases.58 Alleged infringers have
asserted the defense in approximately 25 percent of all patent cases
that have been filed, a number that even judges view as
inappropriately high.59
Asserting the defense of inequitable conduct also creates
exorbitant litigation costs.60 Considering that the subjective element
of intent often involves circumstantial evidence, summary judgment
is particularly difficult, and thus litigation becomes costly.61
Additionally, deposing the prosecuting attorney who handled the
application is almost always necessary in these cases, but such
depositions often involve complex attorney-client privilege issues,
requiring their own additional attorneys and judicial resources to
resolve.62 The actual validity of the patent becomes irrelevant to the
doctrine as determinations of inequitable conduct turn into “satellite
litigations where the effort expended has little spillover benefits for
other parts of the litigation.”63 Unfortunately, the amount of time and
effort spent on the defense tends to turn attention away from the
actual core issues of a case—the validity and infringement of the
patent at issue—and “hamper their complete and correct
resolution.”64
The doctrine also adversely impacts the PTO. Inequitable
conduct requires only material information to be submitted, places no
weight on the quantity of information that is submitted, and urges the
patent applicant to avoid the submission of cumulative information.65
However, because of the doctrine’s harsh penalty of unenforceability
and the excessive litigation costs compared to the low cost of simply
submitting all information in one’s possession to the PTO, the
58. Id. at 1346.
59. Cotropia, supra note 51, at 739–40 (citing Burlington Indus., 849 F.2d at 1422;
Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 1984); FED. TRADE
COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT
LAW AND POLICY 156 (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 740.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.98 (2008); Cotropia, supra note 51, at 763, 770.
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doctrine actually incentivizes patent applicants to err on the side of
quantity.66 Thus, as applicants disclose information that was only
remotely relevant to the claimed subject matter, PTO examiners
receive loads of information that are increasingly immaterial to the
determination of patentability.67 Moreover, PTO examiners are
already overworked as they face an increasing number of
applications with a decreasing amount of time.68 Considering the
highly technical information (the patent application and prior art)
that the examiners must already process, abundant information that
the applicant submits significantly overloads the examiner.69
Similarly, overdisclosure may lead an examiner to waste time on
immaterial information or even cause the examiner to become so
overwhelmed that the examiner will ignore the applicant’s
submission completely.70 Thus, “[t]he bigger the haystack, the more
lost a needle becomes,” and the harm of the overload can negatively
impact the examiner’s ability to reach a proper conclusion on the
application’s patentability.71
A finding of inequitable conduct may also affect patent agents or
attorneys. A failure on behalf of the agents and attorneys to comply
with the doctrine can become the basis of malpractice suits and lead
to disciplinary action before the PTO.72 Agents and attorneys may
even lose their licenses to practice before the PTO.73 Attorneys’
conduct may be referred to their state bar, which can also impose
discipline or revoke attorneys’ general licenses to practice law.74
Furthermore, personal costs may also be at stake, including one’s
reputation within the patent community and with the PTO.75
66. Cotropia, supra note 51, at 763, 770.
67. Id. at 770.
68. Id. at 771.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 771–72.
72. See Edwin S. Flores & Sanford E. Warren, Jr., Inequitable Conduct, Fraud, and Your
License to Practice Before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 299, 314–15 (2000); David Hricik, How Things Snowball: The Ethical Responsibilities and
Liability Risks Arising from Representing a Single Client in Multiple Patent-Related
Representations, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 459 (2005).
73. Flores & Warren, supra note 72, at 314–15.
74. Cotropia, supra note 51, at 766 (citing Flores & Warren, supra note 72, at 314–15).
75. Id. at 763 (citing Kelly Merkel, How to Stump a Corporate Lawyer: Means of Effective
Legal Risk Management for IP Counsel, 1 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 1, 3 (2006)).
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Inequitable conduct may also undermine innovation, which
would be directly contrary to the patent system’s goals of fostering
discovery, development, and investment of innovations.76 Small
companies without experience or the resources that they need to
prosecute their patent applications may not be able to minimize their
vulnerability to allegations of inequitable conduct. For example,
scientists and managers at these companies may act in good faith by
undertaking a commonsense approach to disclosing information and
yet will fail to realize that infringers may later turn their actions into
material and intentional omissions.77 Fearing the threat of the
consequences of inequitable conduct, investors in small companies
may never spend the money that the companies need to turn
innovative ideas into commercial products.78
Yet, despite these shortcomings, some proponents of inequitable
conduct argue that the doctrine polices conduct during the ex parte
patent-application process before the PTO and thus remains useful.79
The PTO issues an estimated 85 percent to 97 percent of filed
patents, and thus, due to this high rate of issuance, it is quite likely
that improperly granted patents do exist.80 Such patents can incur
significant social and economic costs, but the doctrine can remedy
these problems by preventing undeserving patentees from asserting
infringement.81
C. Post-Therasense
Inequitable Conduct
The 6–1–4 en banc decision attempted to cure the ills of the
doctrine and “tighten[] the standards for finding both intent and
materiality in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to

76. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (stating that the patent
system “promotes disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and to permit the public
to practice the invention once the patent expires”).
77. Brief of Amici Curiae Johnson & Johnson and the Procter & Gamble Co. in Support of
Neither Party at 3, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390238.
78. See id. at 4.
79. See, e.g., Katherine Nolan-Stevaux, Inequitable Conduct Claims in the 21st Century:
Combating the Plague, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 147 (2005).
80. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 53 (Stephen
A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
81. Nolan-Stevaux, supra note 79, at 148.
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the detriment of the public.”82 The majority held that “but for”
materiality is required for a finding of inequitable conduct; in making
such a patentability determination, courts should apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard.83 However, the majority also
delineated a critical exception: “When the patentee has engaged in
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an
unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material.”84 The
majority also clarified that “neither mere nondisclosure of prior art
references to the PTO nor failure to mention prior art references in an
affidavit constitutes affirmative egregious misconduct.”85
To satisfy the intent element, the court held that an accused
infringer “must prove that the [applicant misrepresented or omitted
material information] with the specific intent to deceive the PTO.”86
Simply showing that an applicant “knew of a reference, should have
known of its materiality, and decided not to submit it to the PTO”
does not satisfy this standard.87
The court also demolished sliding scale formulations of the
balancing step.88 Once materiality and intent are separately proven by
clear and convincing evidence,89 a patent is only rendered
unenforceable “where the patentee’s misconduct resulted in the
unfair benefit of receiving an unwarranted claim.”90
Both the dissent and Judge O’Malley, who wrote an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed with the majority’s
standard for intent and its requirement that intent and materiality be
separately proven by clear and convincing evidence.91 However, the
dissent argued that “[s]ince its first days, this court has looked to the
PTO’s disclosure rule, Rule 56 . . . as the standard for defining
materiality.”92 The dissent believed that “the PTO is in the best
82. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
83. Id. at 1291–92.
84. Id. at 1292.
85. Id. at 1292–93.
86. Id. at 1290.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1290, 1292.
90. Id. at 1292.
91. Id. at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting); id. at 1297 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
92. Id. at 1303 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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position to know what information examiners need to conduct
effective and efficient examinations”; moreover, the dissent argued
that the majority’s “higher standard of materiality . . . will not
provide appropriate incentives for patent applicants to comply with
the disclosure obligations the PTO places upon them.”93
However, O’Malley believed that both the majority and the
dissent “eschew flexibility in favor of rigidity,” and she disagreed
with both approaches to materiality, finding that both “fail to provide
district courts with flexibility to find inequitable conduct in an
extraordinary case where the conduct in question would not be
defined as such under either test.”94 O’Malley structured a test that
she believed would allow district courts to exercise their discretion in
inequitable inquiries, thereby respecting Supreme Court precedent
that reflected the Court’s recognition of courts of equity.95 She
argued that conduct should be deemed material where:
(1) but for the conduct . . . , the patent would not have
issued . . . ; (2) the conduct constitutes a false or misleading
representation of fact . . . ; or (3) the district court finds that
the behavior is so offensive that the court is left with a firm
conviction that the integrity of the PTO process as to the
application at issue was wholly undermined.96
The en banc panel’s disagreement over materiality indicates that
the doctrine’s reformation may not necessarily be complete.
Moreover, scholars are already questioning the majority’s optimistic
proclamations that the doctrine has been fixed for the better.97 Thus,
the story of the doctrine’s development likely continues.
III. DESIGN AND
METHODOLOGY
The Federal Circuit recognized the need to reform the doctrine
of inequitable conduct and sought the insight from amicus briefs on
how the doctrine should be reformed. Amicus briefs generally
represent a useful source of information that can shed insight into the

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id. at 1298 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1298–99.
Id. at 1300.
See Rantanen & Petherbridge, supra note 8.
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many aspects of patent law and can even impact a court’s decision.
The briefs filed in Therasense particularly highlighted the need to
address the issues of inequitable conduct, and they illustrated the
varying opinions—emanating from various facets of patent law—on
how to alleviate the doctrine’s problems.
The diversity of interests within patent law can be better
understood by analyzing how patent stakeholders cluster in their
amicus briefs.98 Colleen V. Chien previously undertook a large
empirical study of amicus briefs that were filed in Supreme Court
and Federal Circuit patent cases for the last twenty years in an
attempt to better understand the patent system.99 Comparing the
stance of the amici in Therasense with the stances of amici in
Chien’s findings can further validate her results. Additionally, any
differences with Chien’s findings may reveal aspects that are unique
to inequitable conduct. For example, would patent practitioners with
more at stake when they are faced with this affirmative defense argue
differently than they would in other contexts of patent law? Such
insight can prove useful in considering how inequitable conduct
should be reformed.
The author collected the Therasense amicus briefs100 and
categorized them into the following groups: (1) the PTO; (2) bar
associations and intellectual property associations; (3) intellectual
property professors and intellectual property centers in academia; (4)
public interest groups; and (5) industry, which is further subdivided
into bio/pharma companies, high-tech companies, non-practicing
entities (NPEs), and trade associations. Each brief was specifically
analyzed for its arguments on materiality, intent, and the balancing
step.
After considering the standards for each of these three prongs
and the corresponding levels of stringency that are required for
application of the standards, the author drew conclusions on whether
the amici favored patentee or non-patentee standards for inequitable
conduct. For this discussion, the author assumed that a pro-patentee
stance favors stringent standards for inequitable conduct, making it
98. Chien, supra note 11, at 6.
99. Id.
100. The briefs were collected either through Westlaw or by accessing PDF files from Tony
Dutra, Therasense Briefs Ask Federal Circuit to Fix Inconsistency in Inequitable Conduct
Rulings, 80 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 814 (2010).
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difficult for an alleged infringer to successfully assert the defense.101
For arguments of materiality, the author considered that the
“reasonable examiner” test is the weakest and most in favor of nonpatentees. The author also concluded that an “objective but for” test
is the most stringent standard and strongly favors patentees while
Rule 1.56 falls in between these two extremes. For intent, the author
considered “specific intent to deceive” to be a stringent standard that
highly favors patentees; on the other hand, a “should have known”
standard would highly favor non-patentees.
Lastly, an unclear framework for the balancing step, when it is
combined with heightened standards for materiality and intent, may
adversely affect patentees by allowing for findings of inequitable
conduct where there may not be any if a court had considered only
the first two prongs. On the other hand, a carefully delineated
standard for the balancing step and its strict application serves as an
additional requirement that must be met to support a finding of
inequitable conduct and thus likely favors patentees. Therefore, the
author considered that the elimination of a balancing step without
specific guideposts, such as a sliding scale formulation, and the
clarification of an appropriate standard of this prong are propatentee; those who argue for the test’s continuance in its vague state
favor non-patentees. Moreover, arguments for matching the penalty
to the conduct, and thus implementing less harsh remedies as
opposed to only applying unenforceability in all instances, are also
viewed as pro-patentee.
The analysis that is presented in Part IV will include a
comparison to Chien’s conclusions within each category based on
her studies and a discussion of whether the briefs confirm
perceptions of patent interests within particular categories.102
101. However, exceedingly difficult standards may also inadvertently lead to other
consequences that may be harmful to patentees. Such high standards would likely make a finding
of inequitable conduct exceptionally rare, allowing bad actors to obtain and enforce patents on
innovations that likely do not deserve protection and would impute significant costs onto others
within the system who act in good faith. See David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of
Candor as a Limitation on the Duty of Patent Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent
Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 205, 222 (2002) (“Large numbers of improvidently granted patents
may create in terrorem effects on entrepreneurship, ranging from holdup licensing to patent
thickets.”). Thus, stringent standards for inequitable conduct may not necessarily form a propatent system.
102. The Author acknowledges that some results discussed below may be the result of a small
sample size.
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IV. RESULTS:
ANALYZING AMICI’S
ARGUMENTS
In Therasense, various amici, ranging from the PTO to an
intellectual property association composed of law students, filed a
total of thirty-four amicus briefs. Here, industry groups (including
companies and trade associations) and membership groups composed
of intellectual property attorneys and agents, represented
44.1 percent and 35.3 percent of the total briefs, respectively.
Together, these two groups accounted for nearly 80 percent of the
amicus briefs that were filed in this case. “Patent consumers”
(including the government), public interest groups, and academics
(including professors and a university’s center for intellectual
property law) represented the remaining 20.6 percent of the briefs.
FIGURE 1. The Therasense Amici

These results confirm the trend identified by Chien, who also
found that IP lawyers and industries (“patent creators”) represented
75 percent of the briefs that she studied, while citizen groups,
governments, and academics (“patent consumers”) filed the
remaining briefs.103 This trend demonstrates that the patent system is
primarily focused on private interests; however, this is unsurprising
considering the low number of consumer groups that are focused on

103. Chien, supra note 11, at 16.
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patent issues, especially compared to the large number of groups that
are focused on the interests of patent owners and attorneys.104
A. The PTO
The PTO unsurprisingly asserted that its own standard of
materiality, Rule 1.56, should be adopted for three main reasons: (1)
the agency is in the best position to know what information is
essential for determining patentability; (2) the rule presents clear
guidance for applicants; and (3) the rule is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent.105 By contrast, a narrow “but for” standard, where
the patent would not have issued “but for” the misconduct, would
allow applicants to freely “engage in a wide-variety of
misconduct . . . so long as it cannot be proven later that the patent
would not have issued ‘but for’ the misconduct.”106 According to the
PTO, a “reasonable examiner” standard is simply too ambiguous and
fails to provide meaningful guidance.107
The PTO further argued that the proper standard for intent
should be a specific intent to deceive, which would calm the fears of
patent applicants and attorneys that drive them to overdisclose
information to the PTO.108 A court may not infer intent solely from
materiality, but the accused infringer must prove both elements
separately by clear and convincing evidence.109
According to the PTO, given the doctrine’s equitable nature, it
would be inappropriate for a court to automatically hold a patent
unenforceable after the court finds that both the materiality and intent
prongs have been satisfied; therefore, the last element of the test
should not be abolished.110 Instead, the PTO urged the court to clarify
that the balancing step consists of neither a sliding scale nor a rigid
rule but rather requires a court to consider all of the evidence to
determine whether an unenforceability penalty is warranted only

104. Id. at 17.
105. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of
Neither Party at 8–12, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390234, at *8–12.
106. Id. at 12–13.
107. Id. at 16–17.
108. Id. at 17, 18–22.
109. Id. at 25–26.
110. Id. at 25.

Fall 2011]

AMICUS BRIEFS

145

after the accused infringer successfully establishes materiality and
intent by clear and convincing evidence.111
The PTO’s stance for the application of Rule 1.56 did not
entirely favor patentees. However, the PTO’s support for a specific
intent to deceive test indicated its pro-patentee viewpoint. Yet, the
PTO’s call for clarification of the balancing test may tend to favor
patentees; additionally, its argument that courts should apply the
harsh penalty only under limited circumstances indicated more of a
preference for patentees. Thus, the PTO’s proposed standards for
reforming inequitable conduct may lean toward a pro-patentee
stance. This result tends to conflict with that in Chien’s study, which
found that the government often tended to favor non-patentees.112
Perhaps the PTO’s unexpected stance here signals its concern with
the impact of inequitable conduct on the PTO, including such
adverse consequences as overdisclosure and decreased efficiency by
the PTO examiners. Thus, the PTO’s argument should carry
significant weight.113
B. Bar Associations
and Intellectual
Property Associations
Patent attorneys and agents, who are represented by bar and
intellectual property associations, are typical amicus filers. In fact, in
the briefs that Chien analyzed, six such associations reached her list
of the “Top Ten” of all patent amici for their prolific brief filings;114
four of these six filed briefs in Therasense. A total of twelve
different membership groups—composed of patent attorneys, patent
agents, and even intellectual property law students115—accounted for
111. Id. at 25–26.
112. Chien, supra note 11, at 26.
113. Notably, Chien also points out that federal government amici accurately predicted the
winner in 90 percent of Supreme Court cases and in 80 percent of Federal Circuit cases. Id. at 31.
However, the en banc panel disagreed with the PTO’s materiality view. Compare Therasense,
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court does not
adopt the definition of materiality in PTO Rule 56.”), with Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party at 13, supra note 105 (criticizing the
“but for” standard). Perhaps, considering Chien’s findings, the Supreme Court’s holding may side
with the PTO if questions regarding inequitable conduct are ever raised before the Court and the
Court considers them.
114. Chien, supra note 11, at 20.
115. These include: Twenty-two patent prosecution firms and practitioners, American Bar
Association (ABA), American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), Boston Patent

146

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:125

35 percent of the total number of amicus briefs that were filed in
Therasense. In Chien’s findings, membership groups only accounted
for 17 percent of the amici that she studied.116 Although the sample
sizes may account for this difference in percentages, it is possible
that these findings illustrate a heightened interest of attorneys and
agents because of the potential personal consequences that they face
with inequitable conduct.
Four associations (AIPA, IPO, BPLA, and SDIPLA) and
Patterson vouched for an objective “but for” materiality standard
while WSPLA and FCBA supported the PTO’s Rule 1.56(b)(1) and
(b)(1-2), respectively. Interestingly, WSPLA also recommended that
common-law fraud should serve as the basis for inequitable
conduct’s standards, where a misrepresentation or omission would be
material only when at least one claim would not have issued;
however, WSPLA also posited that this standard remains consistent
with Rule 1.56(b)(1) since the failure of the prima facie test would
correlate with the failure of the “but for” standard.117 Also of note,
HIPLA advocated for a “middle ground” approach that falls between
a reasonable examiner standard and a “but for”-type test:
“information is ‘material’ if it was material under the PTO rules
applicable at the time of the examination of the patent at issue.”118
In considering intent, these amici appeared to agree that intent is
a separate element from materiality and cannot be inferred from a
high level of materiality alone. Such an inference would only be
appropriate where it is the “single most reasonable inference” to be
drawn from the evidence. Gross negligence would not be
sufficient.119
Law Association (BPLA), Conejo Valley Bar Association (CVBA), Federal Circuit Bar
Association (FCBA), Houston Intellectual Property Law Association (HIPLA), Intellectual
Property Owners Association (IPO), Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago (IPLAC),
Patterson Thuente Christensen Pedersen, P.A. (Patterson), San Diego Intellectual Property Law
Association (SDIPA), University of Kentucky Intellectual Property Law Association (UKIPLA),
and Washington State Patent Law Association (WSPLA). Patterson is a mid-size intellectual
property firm, but is placed in this category for simplicity and on the assumption that the firm’s
concerns mirrors those of the other groups.
116. Chien, supra note 11, at 16.
117. Amicus Curiae Brief by Washington State Patent Law Ass’n Supporting Neither Party at
10, 15, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595).
118. Brief of the Houston Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of No
Party at 8, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL
3390231, at *8; see infra Table 1.
119. See infra Table 1.
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Several amici in this category argued for the removal of the
balancing step and a return to the principles of common-law fraud.120
Although SDIPLA also argued for the balancing framework to be
removed, it also advocated a slightly different proposition: find
inequitable conduct when information that the patentee intentionally
withheld or misrepresented meets or exceeds Rule 1.56 and tailor an
appropriate remedy where unenforceability is imposed only if the
nature of the withheld or misrepresented information exceeds an
objective “but for” standard.121 On the other hand, three amici
(FCBA, IPO, and HIPLA) actually supported the balancing step;
however, FCBA and IPO also argued that the court must clarify the
importance of this step, which the court should only use as an
exercise of its equitable discretion and where it weighs materiality
and intent to determine if unenforceability is warranted.122 Other
amici, such as CVBA and WSPLA, also echoed the argument that
the penalty should be based on the degree of the inequitable
conduct.123
Within this category, several amici appeared to support a “but
for” materiality standard that strongly favors patentees; others who
addressed the prong argued for standards that clearly favor neither
pro- nor anti-patentees. A stable consensus could be found within
intent, where a significant majority of this category of amici
supported a stringent intent standard. Moreover, several of these
amici supported the removal of the balancing step or a return to
common-law fraud principles, standards that would likely increase a
120. See, e.g., Brief and Appendix of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae at 19–20,
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 2751537, at
*16 (“[A] better standard for determining inequitable conduct is one where the following
elements have been shown, each by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a person having a duty of
candor and good faith to the PTO misrepresented or omitted material information from the PTO;
(2) in the absence of such misrepresentation or omission, the PTO, acting reasonably, would not
have granted or maintained in force at least one patent claim; and (3) the misrepresentation or
omission was made with a specific intent to deceive the PTO, which intent cannot be established
by the mere materiality of the misrepresentation or omission.”).
121. Brief of Amicus Curiae San Diego Intellectual Property Law Ass’n in Support of Neither
Party at 5, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL
3390230, at *5.
122. Brief of the Federal Circuit Bar Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of No Party at 3,
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390230, at
*3; Brief of Intellectual Property Owners Ass’n in Support of Neither Party at 14, Therasense,
649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595).
123. Brief of Amicus Curiae Conejo Valley Bar Ass’n at 6, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos.
2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595); see infra Table 1.
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court’s difficulty in finding inequitable conduct and therefore favor a
patentee. Arguments ensuring that the penalty matches the conduct
also illustrated these amici’s concerns for patentees. Thus, overall,
this category appeared to somewhat favor patentees.124
Chien found that, although bar associations and intellectual
property associations are generally perceived as pro-patentee, they
only filed briefs on behalf of patentees 55 percent of the time.125 But,
considering that patent attorneys and agents face personal
consequences that are as harsh as disbarment due to a finding of
inequitable conduct, it seems unsurprising that the associations
representing them would argue for stringent standards and that the
Therasense case would be a predictable opportunity for these groups
to file briefs on behalf of the patentees.

124. See infra Table 1. One amicus even argued that the conduct be based entirely on
“objectively lawful standards,” which would serve the public interest. Brief of Amicus Curiae
University of Kentucky Intellectual Property Law Society in Support of Neither Party at 17,
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595).
125. Chien, supra note 11, at 26 n.162.
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TABLE 1. Summary of Arguments by Bar Associations

and Intellectual Property Associations
That Demonstrate Their Pro-Patentee Stance126
Bar/IP
Association

Standard of
Materiality

Intent

Balancing

Other

ABA

“But for”

Intent may be proven by
direct and circumstantial
evidence, but not by mere
materiality

Replace and follow
common-law fraud
principles

—

“But for”

Gross negligence is
insufficient; inference of
intent may not be based on
a finding that applicant
should have known of
materiality; cannot infer
from materiality alone, but
applicant’s “knowledge of
materiality” may be
considered in the totality
of circumstances

Replace and follow a
standard for finding
fraud on PTO based on
the totality of the
circumstances

—

IPO

Objective
“but for”

Cannot infer intent solely
from materiality; clear and
convincing evidence of
specific intent to deceive
is required

Maintain balancing as an
exercise of the court’s
equitable discretion in
finding a remedy after
intent and materiality are
affirmatively determined

—

22 Patent
Prosecution
Firms/
Practitioners

—

Clear evidence of
deceptive intent is
required

Abandon

—

BPLA

Objective
“but for”

Separate from materiality

—

—

—

—

Return doctrine to
common-law roots of
fraud; patent
unenforceability
should only apply for
the most egregious
cases

Intent cannot be inferred
solely from materiality

If information meets or
exceeds Rule 1.56, the
court may fashion a
remedy based on the
level of materiality; if
materiality meets the
objective “but for”
standard, the patent is
held unenforceable

—

AIPLA

IPLAC

—

SDIPLA

Meets or
exceeds Rule
1.56 and
objective
“but for”
standard

126. Supra Part IV.B; see Brief for Amici Curiae 22 Patent Prosecution Firms & Practitioners
Supporting Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595), 2010 WL 3390223; Brief of Amicus Curiae the Intellectual Property Law Ass’n of
Chicago Supporting Neither Affirmance nor Reversal, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 20081511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390227; Brief of Amicus Curiae University of
Kentucky Intellectual Property Law Society in Support of Neither Party, supra note 124; Brief for
Amicus Curiae Patterson Thuente Christensen Pedersen, P.A., in Support of Neither Party,
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595).

150

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:125

Bar/IP
Association

Standard of
Materiality

Intent

Balancing

Other

HIPLA

PTO rules
applicable at
time of
examination
of the patent
at issue

Requires clear and
convincing evidence;
inference should only be
made where it is the single
most reasonable inference

Modify with heightened
standards

—

CVBA

FCBA

—

—

—

A finding of
inequitable conduct is
only for exceptional
cases; judges should
decide; the penalty
should be based on
the degree of
inequitable conduct

Current Rule
1.56(b)

Gross negligence, knew,
and should have known
are insufficient to prove
intent; may not be inferred
from materiality only, but
the degree of materiality
should determine the type
or quality of the evidence
needed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence;
courts must find intent to
deceive PTO is the single
most reasonable inference

If the first two prongs
are established by clear
and convincing
evidence, then courts
must determine in equity
whether the patent is
unenforceable

—

UKIPLA

—

—

—

Replace current
framework and at a
minimum modify the
test to emphasize the
public interest in
patents

WSPLA

Common-law
fraud
standards

A specific, fraudulent
intent to deceive is
required

Court has the discretion
to craft an equitable
remedy

—

Patterson

Objective
“but for”;
materiality
can be
considered a
factor in
whether or
not an action
or omission
amounts to a
breach of the
duty of
candor

Abandon

Use two separate
legal frameworks: (1)
for fraud in patent
procurement, the
remedy should be
patent unenforceability; and (2) for
failure of fairness
during patent
prosecution, courts
should fashion a
remedy

Separate frameworks
would remove the need
for inferring intent from
materiality

C. Academics
Professor Christian Mammen, Professor David Hricik, and the
Center for Intellectual Property Law and Technology at the
University of Akron filed amicus briefs representing the interests of
academics. These three briefs represented nearly 9 percent of the
total number of briefs that were filed in Therasense.
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Mammen argued for a clear separation between the elements of
materiality and intent, the application of Rule 1.56, the emphasis on
the necessity for clear and convincing evidence of intent with gross
negligence being insufficient for a finding of intent, and the
abandonment of the balancing step.127 These high standards tended to
favor patentees.128
By contrast, Hricik argued for the abolishment of the doctrine
unless the court felt compelled to continue the inequitable conduct
because of stare decisis, in which case the reasonable examiner
standard should apply for materiality.129 Hricik suggested that courts
can further clarify this standard by requesting that the PTO provide
evidence of its practices and regulations.130 Hricik also appeared to
advocate a high intent standard, arguing that it is insufficient to infer
intent when, for example, highly material information is intentionally
withheld.131 Just as Mammen did, Hricik disapproved of the
balancing step but further argued that a range of equitable remedies
should be available.132
Perhaps the complete abolishment of the doctrine may seem propatentee since it would remove any patentee’s fear of facing an
allegation of the defense during litigation. But this type of scenario
may amplify the possibility that the entire patent system would
become anti-patent, allowing bad actors to remain unpunished for
obtaining and maintaining undeserving patents.133 Therefore,
considering the potential consequences of eliminating the doctrine,
perhaps Hricik’s main viewpoint can be considered at least antipatent system. But, putting these concerns aside, Hricik’s proposed
standard for materiality was less stringent compared to that which
Mammen advocated, signaling an anti-patentee stance; however,

127. Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors Concerning En Banc Review
of Inequitable Conduct and in Support of Neither Party at 4–6, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos.
2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390222, at *4–6.
128. See infra Table 2.
129. Amicus Brief of Professor David Hricik in Support of Neither Party at 14–15,
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390229, at
*11–14.
130. Id. at 8–9.
131. See id. at 14–15.
132. See id. at 19; infra Table 2.
133. See Brief of Amici Curiae Johnson & Johnson and the Proctor & Gamble Co. in Support
of Neither Party, supra note 77, at 4–5.
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Hricik also advocated standards for intent and materiality that would
likely favor patentees.
The Center for Intellectual Property Law and Technology at the
University of Akron advocated a position between Mammen’s and
Hricik’s extremes. The brief argued: (1) Rule 56, as promulgated by
the PTO in 1992, should be used as the materiality standard; (2)
intent cannot be inferred from materiality alone; and (3) if the
remedy is applied to only the affected claims and not to the entire
patent, the court should eliminate the balancing test.134 Although this
materiality standard does not clearly favor patentees, the arguments
concerning intent and balancing tended to show a preference for
patentees.135
Chien’s study, despite a widespread assumption that professors
are anti-patent, revealed that these amici actually supported patentees
nearly 40 percent of the time.136 All three of the Therasense amici
from academia supported standards for inequitable conduct that
would likely favor patentees. Thus, this result corroborates Chien’s
rebuttal against the assumption that academia has an anti-patent
stance.
TABLE 2. Summary of Academics’
Arguments That Demonstrate
Their Pro-Patentee Stance137
Academia

Materiality

Intent

Balancing

Other

Professor
Mammen

Rule 1.56

Separate from materiality; prove by
clear and convincing evidence;
gross negligence is insufficient

Abandon

—

Professor Hricik

Reasonable
examiner

Insufficient to infer intent when
highly material information is
intentionally withheld

Disapproved, but
range of remedies
should be available

Abolish
doctrine

Center of Law
and Technology,
University of
Akron

Rule 1.56
promulgated
by PTO in
1992

Cannot be inferred from materiality
alone

If remedy is applied
only to affected
claims, eliminate

—

134. Brief of Amicus Curiae the University of Akron School of Law, Center for Intellectual
Property Law & Technology, in Support of Affirmance on En Banc Review at 2–3, Therasense,
649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595).
135. See infra Table 2.
136. Chien, supra note 11, at 26–27.
137. See supra Part IV.C.
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D. Public Interest and
Public Policy Groups
Three public interest groups filed amicus briefs in Therasense,
accounting for nearly 9 percent of the total number of briefs that
were filed in the case: International Intellectual Property Institute
(IIPI, a not-for-profit organization); Washington Legal Foundation
(WLF, a public interest law and policy center); and Association of
Citizens for Patent Protection in the Public Interest (ACPPPI, a notfor-profit organization whose mission includes ensuring that patent
protection laws serve the public interest). While IIPI primarily
focused its argument on an objective “but for” test for determining
materiality,138 WLF argued that Rule 1.56(b)(1) should serve as the
materiality standard and that intent should be established by clear
and convincing evidence.139 Moreover, WLF focused on the
balancing test, arguing that “district courts should examine all of the
equities in determining whether inequitable conduct occurred—
including examining whether the patent holder’s misconduct bears
an immediate and necessary relation to the relief it seeks from the
court.”140 Moreover, WLF even suggested that the court withdraw
from holding the entire patent unenforceable after finding inequitable
conduct, arguing that this blanket rule fails to affect claims that bear
“immediate and necessary relation” to the conduct and can only be
described as punishment—which is improper in equity.141
ACPPPI had an interesting take on the materiality standard:
“information is material when it has a natural tendency to influence,
or is capable of influencing, the PTO’s decision to grant a patent.”142
ACPPPI argued that the materiality standard in other contexts is not
so high as to require a “but for” test; such a high standard would
undermine the public interest in ensuring that relevant information
138. Brief of Amicus Curiae International Intellectual Property Institute in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 3, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595), 2010 WL 3481627, at *3.
139. Brief of Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants, Urging Reversal at 7, 11, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513,
-1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390237, at *7, *11.
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id. at 20–21; see infra Table 3.
142. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Ass’n of Citizens for Patent Protection in the Public Interest
in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance at 4, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 20081511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 4622533, at *4.
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that is known to the patent applicant is brought to the PTO’s
examination process.143 In fact, ACPPPI’s stance for materiality
seemed to be reminiscent of a reasonable examiner standard
(although it did not consider a hypothetical examiner).144
Furthermore, unlike the majority of the amici across all
categories, ACPPPI argued that the “single most reasonable
inference” standard is too high; thus, intent can be inferred when a
person with a duty to disclose knowingly makes a material false
statement or omission, misrepresents or withholds information
despite an objectively high likelihood that the information is
material, or misrepresents or withholds information despite knowing
of and consciously disregarding a substantial risk that the
information was material.145
In Chien’s study, public interest and public policy groups tended
to favor non-patentees, supporting patentees less than 30 percent of
the time.146 Here, the ACPPPI’s low standards, as compared to those
of other amici, for materiality and intent indicated a preference for
non-patentees. Conversely, IIPI appeared to support a pro-patentee
standard yet only addressed one prong of the current inequitable
conduct framework. Furthermore, although WLF’s proposal for
Rule 1.56(b)(1) likely did not clearly favor patentees, WLF’s
argument for a high standard for intent, for an “immediate and
necessary relation” between the conduct and the relief, and for the
removal of complete unenforceability may suggest some preference
toward patentees. Thus, two-thirds of these amici appeared to favor
patentees, which is somewhat contrary to Chien’s findings. Perhaps
these results highlight the presence of the amici’s heightened interest
in advancing the twin purposes of the doctrine: (1) enforcing the duty
of good faith and fair dealing that binds patent applicants in dealing
with the public; and (2) protecting the patent system’s “social
utility.”

143. Id. at 5.
144. See infra Table 3.
145. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Ass’n of Citizens for Patent Protection in the Public Interest
in Support of Defendants-Appellees and Affirmance, supra note 142, at 6–7; see infra Table 3.
146. Chien, supra note 11, at 26.
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TABLE 3. Summary of Public Interest
and Public Policy Groups’ Arguments
for Inequitable Conduct147
Public Interest
and Public
Policy Groups
IIPI

Balancing

Other

Stance
Toward
Patentees

—

—

—

For

Remove
unenforceability as a
penalty

For

—

Against

Materiality

Intent

Objective
“but for”

WLF

Rule
1.56(b)(1)

Establish by
clear and
convincing
evidence

Examine all equities to
find if inequitable
conduct occurred,
including whether
misconduct bears an
“immediate and
necessary relation” to
the relief sought

ACPPI

“Natural
tendency to
influence”

“Single most
reasonable
inference” is too
high a standard

—

E. Industry
Fifteen amicus briefs were filed by parties in several industries,
ranging from flooring and lighting companies to biotechnology and
pharmaceutical firms. These briefs represented the largest group of
amici in Therasense (about 44 percent of the total number of briefs
that were filed in the case).
Interestingly, the majority of the amici in this category agreed
on a high standard for finding intent: gross negligence is insufficient,
intent cannot be inferred from materiality alone, and specific or
deceptive intent must be separately established from materiality by
clear and convincing evidence.148 Sap America even suggested
factors that a court may invoke when analyzing whether a patent

147. See supra Part IV.D.
148. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae 43 Patent Practitioners Employed by Eli Lilly & Co., in
Support of No Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595),
2010 WL 3390224; Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595), 2010 WL 3390221; Brief of Amici Curiae Ole K. Nilssen & Geo Foundation, Ltd. in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants Abbot Diabetes Care, Inc. & Abbot Laboratories’ Brief on
Rehearing En Banc Supporting Reversal, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,
-1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390228; Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Sap America, Inc. in
Support of Neither Party, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595), 2010 WL 3390216.
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owner had the requisite intent during the alleged misconduct.149
However, Apotex, a private pharmaceutical company, varied from
other amici and argued that intent may be established by a “known or
should have known” standard.150 Moreover, materiality could be
considered in determining whether an inference of deceptive intent is
appropriate since materiality and culpability are often intertwined.151
Considering the large consensus for a high standard concerning
intent (a pro-patentee stance), the following discussion will mostly
focus on the materiality and balancing prongs, where the amici’s
arguments varied significantly. Because of the diverse interests
across the myriad technologies that the amici represented, the
following discussion divides the amici into the following
categories152: (1) bio/pharma companies;153 (2) high-tech
companies;154 (4) non-practicing entities (NPEs);155 and (4) trade
associations.156
149. See, e.g., Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Sap America, Inc. in Support of Neither
Party at 2–3, supra note 148.
150. Brief of Amicus Curiae Apotex, Inc. Not Supporting Any Party at 17–23, Therasense,
649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 339024, at *17–23.
151. Id. at 18.
152. The following pairs of amici that fall within different categories but filed joint briefs are
considered separately for this discussion: Microsoft Corporation (high-tech) and Sanofi-Aventis
(pharma); and Teva Pharmaceuticals (pharma) and Cisco Systems, Inc. (high-tech).
153. These amici are: Apotex, Eisai, Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble,
Sanofi-Avenits, and Teva.
154. These amici are: Cisco Systems, Dolby, Ecore, Intel, Microsoft, Sap America, and
Verizon.
155. A non-practicing entity is a “patent owner who does not manufacture or use the patented
invention, but rather than abandoning the right to exclude, an NPE seeks to enforce its right
through the negotiation of licenses and litigation.” Miranda Jones, Comment, Permanent
Injunction, A Remedy by Any Other Name Is Patently Not the Same: How Ebay v. Mercexchange
Affects the Patent Right of Non-Practicing Entities, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1035, 1036 (2007).
Amici Acacia and 1st Media (who jointly filed a brief in Therasense) have previously been
considered NPEs and thus are categorized as such here. Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or MarketMakers? An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 160 (2010).
As Shrestha has noted, “the news media is the only means, in the public domain, of compiling a
list of NPEs.” Id. at 159. A search of Ole K. Nilssen, an individual inventor of electric lighting,
produced a recent commentary that described the inventor as an NPE. Peter Zura, District Court
Awards $2.5M in Sanctions for NPE Asserting Unenforceable Patents, THE 271 PATENT BLOG
(July 20, 2009, 10:02 AM), http://271patent.blogspot.com/2009/07/district-court-awards-almost25m-in.html. Thus, for simplicity here, Nilssen and his exclusive licensee, Geo Foundation, Ltd.,
are considered as part of this category.
156. These amici, representing the bio/pharma industry, are: Biotechnology Industry
Organization (BIO), Generic Pharmaceutical Association (GPhA) who joined Teva
Pharmaceuticals and Cisco in one brief, and Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA).
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1. Bio/Pharma Companies
The bio/pharma amici did not reach a clear consensus on a
standard for materiality. For example, one amici argued for a
reasonable examiner standard;157 on the other hand, another amici
argued that the “but for” standard should not be used and even
suggested that this occasion was an inappropriate time to
differentiate between Rule 1.56 and a reasonable examiner test.158 Eli
Lilly advocated for an interesting take on the materiality standard: a
“standard for materiality must require at least that a patent with an
illegitimate scope of protection was issued.”159 Additionally, Apotex
argued that materiality could continue to be assessed by any
prevailing standards, including Rule 1.56 and the “but for”
standard.160
Most of the bio/pharma amici argued for the elimination of the
balancing step or at least for balancing the remedy against the harm
(as opposed to comparing materiality and intent within a sliding scale
approach). On the other hand, two amici (Apotex and Teva) argued
for the maintenance of this step, which would allow more materiality
to indicate intent.161
Notably, Johnson & Johnson and Procter & Gamble filed a joint
amicus brief and took a different approach to answering the
questions that the Federal Circuit posed. These amici argued that
responsibility for policing misconduct before the PTO belongs to the
PTO rather than to the courts.162 Thus, the federal courts must limit
their considerations of patent applicant misconduct and only
adjudicate allegations of misconduct when it is brought upon the

157. Brief of Eisai Co., Ltd. & Eisai Inc. as Amici Curiae on Rehearing En Banc in Support
of Neither Party at 15, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (Nos., 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390220, at *15.
158. Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al., in Support of Appellees
and in Favor of Affirmance at 9–10 n.6, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512,
-1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 4622535, at *9–10 n.6.
159. Brief of Amicus Curiae 43 Patent Practitioners Employed by Eli Lilly & Co., in Support
of No Party, supra note 148,
at 4.
160. Brief of Amicus Curiae Apotex, Inc. Not Supporting Any Party, supra note 150, at 13–
16; see infra Table 4.
161. See infra Table 4.
162. Brief of Amici Curiae Johnson & Johnson and the Procter & Gamble Co. in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 77, at 17–18.
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courts by the litigants’ actions in the course of litigation.163 With such
a narrowed application of the doctrine, perhaps such a stance may be
considered as pro-patentee since patentees may face fewer
inequitable conduct allegations as a result of such an approach.164
For those that discussed intent and balancing, the bio/pharma
amici agreed on pro-patentee standards for these two prongs.
However, the amici greatly differed in their views on materiality.
Five amici could arguably be considered pro-patentee165 while two
amici tended to favor non-patentees.166 Chien previously found that
bio/pharma amici supported patentees 56 percent of the time,
although the difference was not statistically significant.167 However,
the division between the bio/pharma amici in Therasense may
confirm Chien’s findings.
Nevertheless, Chien also found that the amici’s business models
were better predictors for whether the amici favored patentees or
non-patentees: public companies, regardless of industry, favored the
patentee only 32 percent of the time.168 The bio/pharma amici in
Therasense were nearly all public companies (only Apotex was
private),169 and 83 percent of these public companies appeared to be
pro-patentee. Although the differences between the percentages in
Chien’s findings and in this Note’s study may be attributed to a
smaller sample size in Therasense, perhaps it is also indicative of the
industry’s strong interest in inequitable conduct. Bio/pharma
companies are typically known for their preference for strong patents
to protect their investments, yet Chien’s study revealed only weak
support for this expectation.170 However, Therasense may uniquely
reveal more pro-patentee support from this industry based on the
consequences that are associated with inequitable conduct, such as
the potential invalidation of long-standing and heavily-invested
patents and of those that are related to the patent at issue.
163. Id. at 16–17.
164. See infra Table 4.
165. Eisai; Eli Lilly (although it is perhaps not entirely evident if an “illegitimate scope”
standard for materiality can clearly favor patentees); Johnson & Johnson, Procter & Gamble; and
Sanofi-Aventis.
166. Apotex and Teva; see infra Table 4.
167. Chien, supra note 11, at 24.
168. Id. at 24–25.
169. Eisai and Teva.
170. Chien, supra note 11, at 24–26.
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TABLE 4. Summary of Arguments
by Amici from the
Biotech/Pharma Industry171
Balancing

Other

Stance
Toward
Patentee

Apotex (Private)

Rule 1.56 and
“but for”

Maintain

—

Against

Eisai (Public)

Objective reasonable
examiner

Fashion appropriate
remedies

—

For

Eli Lilly (Public)

“Illegitimate scope”

Eliminate

—

For
For

Biotech/Pharma
Industry

Materiality

Johnson & Johnson
(Public)

—

—

PTO should police
the misconduct

Procter & Gamble
(Public)

—

—

PTO should police
the misconduct

For

Sanofi-Aventis
(Public)

Separate from intent

Sliding scale is
wrong

—

For

Teva (Public)

Reject “but for”

Maintain

—

Against

2. High-Tech Companies
Turning to the amici within the high-tech industry, they argued
for a variety of materiality standards, such as the “but for”
standard,172 the reasonable examiner test,173 or neither.174
Additionally, for those that discussed the issue, some amici
advocated for the elimination of the balancing step, although Intel
urged the court to consider the misconduct to see if, in equity, a
harsh unenforceability penalty was warranted.175 Verizon echoed the
remedy concern, suggesting that courts consider a range of
remedies.176 Because of their support for a high level of materiality,
171. Supra Part IV.E.1; see Brief for Sanofi-Aventis & Microsoft Corp. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants and Reversal at 11, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3229935, at *11.
172. Brief of Amicus Curiae Ecore International, Inc. in Support of Neither Party at 3,
Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 3390236, at
*3.
173. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intel Corp. in Support of the Appellees at 8, Therasense, 649
F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 4622534, at *8.
174. Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al. in Support of Appellees
and in Favor of Affirmance, supra note 158.
175. Brief of Amicus Curiae Intel Corp. in Support of the Appellees, supra note 173, at 3–4.
176. Brief for Verizon Communications Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party on
Rehearing En Banc at 4–8, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595), 2010 WL 2861897, at *4–8.

160

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:125

the elimination of the balancing step, and varying levels of remedy,
only six amici177 tended to favor the patentee. Only one amici178
favored a non-patentee stance, arguing for weaker materiality
standards and even for maintaining the current balancing step.179
According to Chien, high-tech industries, where the cumulative
nature of innovation creates liabilities for companies that introduce
new technologies, unsurprisingly tended to oppose patentees;180 in
fact, her study revealed that high-tech companies supported patentees
only 36 percent of the time.181 In Therasense, 86 percent of these
companies supported patentees, perhaps showing this industry’s
increased concern for the doctrine’s potentially harsh consequences.
However, Chien conceded that her finding was not statistically
significant and turned her analysis to a company’s business model,
finding that public companies favored the patentee only 32 percent of
the time.182 Of the seven high-tech amici in Therasense, six were
public companies,183 and 83 percent of those public companies
appeared to favor the patentees. These results present an interesting
contrast to Chien’s conclusion that public companies, regardless of
industry, more often favor an anti-patentee stance. Perhaps the
industry’s nature of innovation—which often creates liabilities and
thus causes companies to possibly face increased litigation in which
there exist significant chances that they will encounter inequitable
conduct as an affirmative defense—causes the doctrine to raise
enough concern within the bio/pharma industry, thereby leading to
this reversal toward a preference for patentees.

177. Dolby, Ecore, Intel, Microsoft, Sap, and Verizon.
178. Cisco.
179. Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al. in Support of Appellees
and in Favor of Affirmance, supra note 158, at 3–4; see infra Table 5.
180. Chien, supra note 11, at 25.
181. Id. at 24.
182. Id. at 24–25.
183. Cisco, Dolby, Intel, Microsoft, Sap, and Verizon.
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TABLE 5. Summary of Arguments
by Amici from the High-Tech Industry184
High-tech
Industry

Materiality

Balancing

Other

Stance
Toward
Patentee

Cisco (Public)

Reject “but for”

Maintain

—

Against

Dolby (Public)

—

Eliminate

—

For

Ecore (Private)

Objective “but for”

—

—

For

Intel (Public)

“Reasonable examiner”

Balance remedies
with inequitable
conduct

—

For

Microsoft (Public)

Separate from intent

Sliding scale is
wrong

—

For

—

Employ factors to
determine credibility
of the applicant

For

—

Consider availability
of remedies less severe
than unenforceability,
particularly overriding
the presumption of
validity

For

Sap (Public)

Verizon (Public)

—

—

3. NPEs
Because Chien found that a business model can predict an
amici’s pro- or non-patentee stance, the author separately considered
NPEs. Acacia Research Corp. and 1st Media, LLC argued that
inequitable conduct should not exist since the defense lacks any
statutory foundation.185 Such a complete abolishment of the doctrine
would allow patentees to avoid facing the defense and thus
represents a pro-patentee stance.186 Other NPEs, Ole K. Nilssen and
Geo Foundation, argued that Rule 1.56 should serve as the

184. Supra Part IV.E.2; see Brief of Amicus Curiae Dolby Laboratories, Inc. in Support of
Neither Party, Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Nos.
2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595), 2010 WL 2861896; Brief for Sanofi-Aventis &
Microsoft Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants and Reversal, supra note 171; Corrected
Brief of Amicus Curiae Sap America, Inc. in Support of Neither Party, supra note 148; Brief of
Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. et al. in Support of Appellees and in Favor of
Affirmance, supra note 158.
185. Brief of Amici Curiae Acacia Research Corp. & 1st Media, LLC in Support of Neither
Party and in Support of Returning the “Unenforceability” Defense to Its Traditional Scope of
“Unclean Hands” at 2, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514, -1595),
2010 WL 3390243, at *2.
186. However, this stance may also be considered anti-patent system. See Nolan-Stevaux,
supra note 79, at 165.
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materiality standard and that the courts should employ an
“immediate and necessary relation” requirement between the
asserted patent rights and misconduct.187 Although the Rule 1.56
standard is weaker than a “but for” standard and may not necessarily
favor non-patentees, the high level of intent and a close causal
connection between the patent rights and misconduct likely protects
a patentee; thus, Ole K. Nilssen and Geo Foundation’s stance may be
considered pro-patentee.188 These results confirm Chien’s findings
that NPEs favor patentees nearly all of the time. Moreover, these
results are unsurprising given that the often-litigious NPEs would
likely prefer to avoid having inequitable conduct defenses asserted
against them.
TABLE 6. Summary of
Arguments by NPEs189
NPEs
Acacia

Materiality
—

Stance
Toward
Patentee

Balancing

Other

—

Doctrine should
not exist

For
For

1st Media

—

—

Doctrine should
not exist

Ole K. Nilssen

Rule 1.56

“Immediate and
necessary relation”

—

For

Geo Foundation

Rule 1.56

“Immediate and
necessary relation”

—

For

4. Trade Associations
Three trade associations that represent the bio/pharma industry
also filed amicus briefs: BIO, PhRMA, and GPhA. These amici
varied in their arguments for a materiality standard: BIO argued for a
“but for” standard that is considered at the time of trial,190 while
PhRMA argued that information is material “only if that information

187. Brief of Amici Curiae Ole K. Nilssen & Geo Foundation, Ltd. in Support of PlaintiffsAppellants Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. & Abbot Laboratories’ Brief on Rehearing En Banc
Supporting Reversal, supra note 148, at 4–5.
188. See infra Table 6.
189. See supra Part IV.E.3.
190. Brief of the Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 148, at 21.
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establishes that one or more of the claims asserted in the litigation is
invalid.”191 However, in practice, the differences between these two
standards may not be significant, and both appear to require a high
level of materiality. Moreover, BIO and PhRMA agreed that the
balancing step must be abandoned. Overall then, these two trade
associations appeared to take a pro-patentee stance. On the other
hand, GPhA argued against a “but for” standard and for maintenance
of the current state of inequitable conduct, and thus GPha seemingly
favored a non-patentee stance.192
Chien found that groups that represent bio/pharma/chem only
supported patentees 59 percent of the time, and although the sample
size was statistically insignificant, the result still confirmed the
perceptions of the patent group.193 Two-thirds of the trade
associations’ briefs in Therasense favored patentees; although three
amici may have been a statistically insignificant sample size, the
trade associations’ arguments were still consistent with the
expectation that their industries would favor strong patent protection.
TABLE 7. Summary of Arguments by
Industrial Trade Associations194
Industrial Trade
Associations

Materiality

Balancing

Stance Toward Patentee

BIO

“But for”

Eliminate

For

PhRMA

“Asserted claims”

Eliminate

For

GPhA

Reject “but for”

Maintain

Against

F. Summary
The percentages of Therasense amici, by category, that favored
pro-patentee standards for inequitable conduct are summarized in
Table 8. Table 8 also provides Chien’s results for comparison. As
shown in Table 8, three categories of amici (“Bar Associations and
191. Brief of Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Neither Party at 6, Therasense, 649 F.3d 1276 (Nos. 2008-1511, -1512, -1513, -1514,
-1595).
192. Infra Table 7; see Brief of Amici Curiae Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al., in
Support of Appellees and in Favor of Affirmance, supra note 158.
193. Chien, supra note 11, at 26.
194. See supra Part IV.E.4.
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Intellectual Property Associations,” “Public Interest and Public
Policy Groups,” and the “High-tech Industry”)195 varied from those in
Chien’s results. Moreover, public companies, regardless of industry,
also contrasted with those in Chien’s findings.
TABLE 8. Percentages of Therasense
Amici that Favor Patentees, by Category,
as Compared to Chien’s Findings
Category

Percentage of Therasense
Amici Favoring Patentee

Percentage of Time That
Amici Favored Patentee
According to Chien’s Findings
28 %

PTO

100 %

Bar/IP Associations

100 %

55 %

Academia

100 %

Nearly 40 %

Public Interest/
Policy Group

66 %

20 %

Bio/Pharma Industry

71 %
(83 % of public,
bio/pharma companies)

56 %
(public companies,
regardless of industry: 32 %)

High-Tech Industry

86 %
(83 % of public,
high-tech companies)

36 %
(public companies,
regardless of industry: 32 %)

NPEs

100 %

98 %

Trade Associations

66 %

59 %

V. PROPOSAL
AND JUSTIFICATION
Amicus briefs “reflect the complexity of [major commercial and
societal] concerns”196 and, as such, represent an important source “for
studying patent groups and their interests in the patent system.”197
The thirty-four briefs that were filed in Therasense thus provide
useful insight into how inequitable conduct affects the various
contexts of patent law that each amici represents. The briefs also
included proposals, some traditional and others unique, on how the

195. Chien’s findings rebutted the assumption that academia was anti-patentee. Although
academics appear to favor patentees at a higher percentage rate than Chien’s findings indicate that
it does, the percentage found in analyzing the Therasense academia amici further corroborates
Chien’s rebuttal.
196. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
197. Chien, supra note 11, at 6.
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doctrine should be modified. In light of these arguments, this Note’s
proposal seeks to synthesize the myriad views presented by the
diverse amici into a workable test: (1) courts should adopt Rule 1.56
as the materiality standard, which the Federal Circuit can further
clarify by establishing factors for lower courts to consider in
evaluating this prong; (2) courts should reaffirm specific intent to
deceive as the appropriate standard for intent; and (3) courts should
eliminate a sliding scale approach to the balancing step and maintain
the harsh penalty of unenforceability.
Moreover, the Therasense amici, both within each category and
across categories, came to a consensus on certain viewpoints. The
Federal Circuit should take particular note of that agreement. On the
other hand, as Part IV revealed, certain amici’s arguments appeared
to be surprising based on expectations of their viewpoints according
to Chien’s findings. These contrasting results shed light on how
inequitable conduct can particularly impact the contexts of patent
law that these amici represent. Thus, this proposal merely suggests
that the court should pay particular attention to certain amici that
may face significant consequences from inequitable conduct in ways
that may not be present in other doctrines of patent law.
A. Listening to the Amici
Amici often influence courts; the federal government and the
PTO have been particularly successful in swaying the Federal Circuit
and even the Supreme Court.198 However, because of the doctrine’s
widespread ramifications—which extend beyond the litigants and
impact the court system, patent practitioners, and the PTO—the
Federal Circuit should have taken a closer look at arguments that the
varied amici advanced instead of only considering those amici with a
history of success with the courts.199
Part V revealed that three categories of amici (Bar Associations
and Intellectual Property Associations, Public Interest and Public
Policy Groups, and the High-tech Industry) and public companies,
198. Id. at 28–29.
199. The Federal Circuit, in its en banc Therasense decision, appears to have at least
acknowledged some amici. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1294
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Notably, both the American Bar Association and the American Intellectual
Property Law Association, which represent a wide spectrum of interests, support requiring but-for
materiality . . . .”); id. at 1305 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“As the PTO persuasively argues in its
amicus brief . . . .”).
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regardless of industry, surprisingly favored pro-patentee standards.
Because of the potential adverse consequences on the careers of
patent agents and attorneys, perhaps a court should give less
credence to bar associations and intellectual property associations
representing these practitioners here. A more significant preference
for pro-patentee standards (as compared to the preference that is
illustrated in Chien’s results) by public interest and public policy
groups may reveal their concerns with maintaining the integrity of
the patent system, one of the key purposes of inequitable conduct.
Moreover, high-tech industry and public companies’ preferences for
patentees likely reflect these amici’s heightened concerns for having
to potentially battle the defense and face the invalidation of their
long-standing, heavily-invested patents, signaling their “commercial
interest” at stake. Consequently, the Federal Circuit should
particularly note briefs filed by public interest and public policy
groups, high-tech industries, and public companies.
The PTO’s amicus brief also should be carefully considered
because of the close relationship between the ex parte process of
patent prosecution in front of the PTO and the subsequent allegations
of inequitable conduct. In fact, the government is often particularly
persuasive and often predicts the accurate “winner” of a case.200
However, this proposal posits that the Federal Circuit should not
only grant this amicus significant consideration but also equally
consider other amici, especially those that are highlighted above.
B. Fashioning the Test
The amici varied significantly across all categories in their
opinions on the materiality prong. Likewise, the en banc panel also
disagreed as to the appropriate standard for this element,201 and thus
the standard for materiality may not necessarily be entirely settled
law yet. On the one hand, a “but for” standard may not appropriately
catch bad actors who affirmatively withhold or misrepresent material
information to the PTO but whose misconduct did not affect the
validity of the patent. On the other hand, a reasonable examiner

200. Chien, supra note 11, at 31. Contra Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1276, 1293–94 (disagreeing
with the PTO’s argument for Rule 1.56 as the standard for materiality).
201. See supra Part II.C.
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standard also appears to be too amorphous and forces the court to
consider the hypothetical examiner.
Therefore, Rule 1.56 may be an appropriate middle ground for
the courts to adopt, but it may not set the bar high enough to warrant
unenforceability as punishment. Some amici also argued that courts
are not bound to follow regulations that the PTO sets. Moreover, oral
arguments during the Therasense en banc hearing showed that the
Federal Circuit exhibited some reluctance toward this standard,
particularly with the potential breadth of Rule 1.56(b)(2).202 The
majority’s opinion and adoption of the “but for” standard reflects
these concerns.203 However, although the PTO’s regulations would
not be binding on the courts, the courts can still look to the PTO for
useful guidance and choose to adopt the PTO’s standard.
Then again, perhaps the materiality standard that the court
ultimately adopts will have little impact,204 and the Federal Circuit’s
main concern over materiality is unfounded. The amici that are under
examination here and other scholarly commentary have suggested
that the Federal Circuit should simply articulate factors to aid courts
in determining materiality.205 Even given the Therasense majority’s
“but for” standard, delineating specific factors as additional guidance
for courts to look to would surely help, especially in light of the
court’s new “affirmative egregious misconduct” exception.
The vast majority of all amici tended to agree that the level of
intent for a finding of inequitable conduct must be high. Under such
a standard, gross negligence would not be enough to satisfy this
prong; moreover, intent must be established independent of
materiality and satisfy a clear and convincing evidence standard.
This harmony across the diverse interests within the patent system
should signal to the court that this standard is appropriate. However,
if such a consensus exists, why is intent even at issue? Intent was
shown to be the more critical factor as compared to materiality or the

202. Bruce M. Wexler, Today’s En Banc Oral Argument in Therasense: The Federal Circuit
Wrestles with How Much to Reform Inequitable Conduct, PAUL HASTINGS STAY CURRENT: A
CLIENT ALERT FROM PAUL HASTINGS (Nov. 2010), http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/
publications/1757.pdf?wt.mc_ID=1757.pdf.
203. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293–95.
204. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 28 n.70.
205. Id. at 56–57; see Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Sap America, Inc. in Support of
Neither Party, supra note 148, at 18.

168

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:125

balancing step.206 However, the Federal Circuit previously appeared
to have a different understanding of intent than lower courts had,207
amplifying the confusion that surrounded the doctrine’s framework.
The Federal Circuit’s reaffirmance of the requirement of a specific
intent to deceive is in line with the majority of the amici’s view, and
perhaps the Therasense court even took this into account in reaching
its holding for intent.
The amici in Therasense varied more in their opinions on the
balancing step, with arguments for the maintenance, modification, or
elimination of its current framework. However, as some amici
argued, if the bar for the other two prongs of inequitable conduct is
set sufficiently high, the balancing step is unnecessary.208 Moreover,
in practice, this step appears to be a mere formality rather than a
substantive part of the doctrine’s framework.209 Regardless of its
actual role in practice, this prong’s articulation at least needed
clarification. Moreover, as some notable amici argued,210 any sliding
scale approach should be eliminated.
Although other amici argued that the balancing step should
entail an inquiry into whether unenforceability is a warranted penalty
and whether the court should fashion remedies that are more
appropriate to the conduct, these arguments seem unavailing. The
other two prongs’ standards are set sufficiently high such that a
finding of inequitable conduct only arises for misconduct that
warrants the harsh penalty of unenforceability. By maintaining such
a harsh penalty, the courts may hopefully deter bad actors from
adversely affecting the patent system. Thus, the societal interest in
the patent system can be protected, thereby furthering a key purpose
of inequitable conduct. Perhaps the Federal Circuit’s grant of
unenforceability “where the patentee’s misconduct resulted in the
unfair benefit of receiving an unwarranted claim”211 should be
revised.

206. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 29–39.
207. Id. at 43.
208. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Intellectual Property Law Professors Concerning En
Banc Review of Inequitable Conduct and in Support of Neither Party, supra note 127, at 6.
209. Petherbridge et al., supra note 31, at 33.
210. See supra Part III.
211. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of inequitable conduct has led to several serious
consequences that have impacted the court system, patentees and
their industries, patent attorneys and agents, and the PTO. The
plethora of amicus briefs that were filed in Therasense—which
represent an important source of information that highlights the
many contexts of patent law and that can even influence a court’s
decision—demonstrates the widespread interest concerning the
doctrine’s reform. Although the amici did not entirely agree on
exactly how the doctrine should be reshaped, clarification of the
exact standards for courts to use in finding inequitable conduct is
necessary to alleviate the doctrine’s problems. Nonetheless, the
Therasense majority’s new interpretation of the doctrine may need
some additional reformation. A majority of the amici voiced that a
finding of intent should require more than just gross negligence.
Moreover, sliding scale formulations of the balancing step should be
eliminated, and more specific guidance on performing materiality
inquiries may be useful. However, the PTO’s Rule 1.56 should be the
materiality standard that the court adopts. With clearly articulated
standards for inequitable conduct, courts should be able to eliminate
the “plague” on the patent system.
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